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Abstract
Recently, the French Senate approved a law that imposes a 3% tax on revenue generated from digital services by
companies above a certain size. While there is a lot of political debate about economic consequences of this action,
it is actually interesting to reverse the question: We consider the long-term implications of an economy with no such
digital tax. More generally, we can think of digital services as a special case of products with low or zero cost of trans-
portation. With basic economic models we show that a market with no transportation costs is prone to monopolization
as minuscule, random differences in quality are rewarded disproportionally. We then propose a distance-based tax to
counter-balance the tendencies of random centralisation. Unlike a tax that scales with physical (cardinal) distance, a
ranked (ordinal) distance tax leverages the benefits of digitalization while maintaining a stable economy.
Until not too long ago, people used to live in relatively
self-contained tribes or villages. Basic products such as
bread and textiles were produced locally. Trade primarily
existed for specialised products. Over time, from the in-
dustrial revolution through present technological advance-
ments in AI, more efficient distribution channels have
emerged. Online orders are often delivered within a cou-
ple days, independent of a customers physical location.
Extrapolated, this trend leads to an economy where, at
least domestically, physical shipping distance becomes ir-
relevant. For digital products and services, this has largely
become a reality and contradicts established economic
theories, like Isard (1954)’s gravity model of trade which
states that trade activity is inversely proportional to phys-
ical distance.
To formally analyse the potential impact of vanishing
distance-based transaction costs, we consider the follow-
ing simple model: Two firms offering the same product
are competing for a total of n potential buyers. Firms
and buyers are randomly placed on a one-dimensional
ring of length ` with periodic boundary conditions (Fig-
ure 1). Hence, the maximum distance between any buyer
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and firm is d = `/2.
Figure 1: Ring of length ` = 1 representing a ‘geography’, on which
we place at random two firms (circles) and n = 12 buyers (crosses).
Here we have picked a balanced configuration where each firm has
n = 6 closest potential customers. Throughout this article, we con-
sider the buyer and firm arrangement fixed as shown here. Any other
generic arrangement or geography could be used and would not sig-
nificantly alter our results. The two firms compete for profit. They set
their production quantity and prices according to the Nash equilibrium,
taking into consideration the different levels of taxation.
Firm i (i = 1, 2) produces qi units of the good at unit
cost ci and offers to sell at a price pi. Their profit calcu-
lates to Πi = piqˆi − ciqi where qˆi is the quantity that is
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actually sold (qˆi 6 qi).
The buyers cannot buy at price pi, but additionally have
to pay a transaction cost λ · dγ · pi where d is the distance
between a given buyer and firm i. From hereon, we shall
call this the cardinal tax. In its most basic form, the grav-
ity model predicts a value of γ = 2, whereas here we have
set γ = 1. 1 The case of zero cost of transportation is re-
covered in the limit where the scaling factor λ approaches
zero. The buyers are all characterised by the same nega-
tively sloped demand curve, p = u − q with u the upper
price limit at which no good is bought. In the remainder
of this article, we set λ = 0.1 and u = 120. 1
The two firms choose capacity and price to maximize
their respective profit in equilibrium. Here, we assume
they first compete on capacity, by simultaneously declar-
ing how many units they produce; next, they compete on
price, taking into consideration the tax and assuming the
location of buyers is known. This process, consisting of
these two dependent sub-games, is similar to the game
theoretical problems studied by Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983), the major difference being the buyer-seller spe-
cific tax. Quantity and price offered by each firm are de-
termined as the Nash equilibrium of this two-stage game.
Because the tax depends on the exact location of buyers
and firms, it is not possible to determine the Nash equi-
librium analytically, for general cases. Instead, we use
the Gambit library developed by McKelvey and Turocy
(2016) to find the Nash equilibrium numerically.
As both firms are offering the same good, they differ
only in their marginal cost of production ci (and their
physical location, as shown in Figure 1). Let us con-
sider the case where both firms are equally competitive
(c1 = c2 = 100), solve for Nash equilibrium prices and
consider their profits. We find that their relative differ-
ence in profit is 5% (see left axis in Figure 2 for a visual-
isation of this and subsequent results). This difference is
relatively small as we have chosen a rather homogeneous
distribution of buyers and firms (Figure 1). If the distribu-
tion of buyers were more irregular, so would be the profits,
1 Changing these numbers does not alter the qualitative statements
of our results, while some of the numbers quoted in Figure 2 may
change.
and the firms would ultimately move to similar locations,
as was already predicted by Hotelling (1929).
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Figure 2: On the left axis (blue bars), we show the relative difference
in profit of the two firms. If both firms have equal production cost,
their revenue is similar. This remains true if there is a marginal 1%
difference in cost, as long as there is a distance dependent cardinal tax.
Imbalance in revenue is increased drastically once that tax is removed,
but is decreased again in case it is replaced by an ordinal tax. Ma-
jor imbalances in production costs (i.e. competitive advantage) lead to
significantly different revenue with and without tax. On the right axis
(orange bars), we show the relative difference in total market revenue,
as generated by the two firms combined. The revenue is rescaled to a
value of 1 for the case of no tax. All other revenue values are in pro-
portion thereof. While the cardinal tax significantly decreases revenue,
the ordinal tax brings it back to a similar level than without any tax.
If there is no cost of transportation, the difference in
profit is zero as predicted by symmetry (both firms are
exactly equal). However, this equality is highly unstable.
To see this, let us now consider the case where firm 1 is
marginally more competitive (c1 = 99, c2 = 100). As long
as there is a cost of transportation (λ = 0.1), the difference
in profit merely increases from 5% to 7%. But in absence
of such a cardinal tax (λ = 0), the difference in profit
amounts to a whopping 33%! This result is particularly
bothersome as this excess profit can be used to further de-
crease costs of production. Either through genuine inno-
vation, or temporary undercutting of prices, the difference
between c1 and c2 is further enlarged and the second firm
is eventually run out of business. 2 In general, the outpace
2 This claim can be formalised by considering multi-stage games.
2
of competition is natural and in many cases even desired,
as efficiency is to be rewarded. However, we stress that
a minor, essentially random difference of 1% production
cost disproportionally benefited one firm. We may ratio-
nalise this by going back to the example of self-contained
villages from the introduction: Once there is no more cost
of transportation, the economic agent has little incentive
to favour local bread, if bread from another village is just
marginally cheaper. Monopolisation initiated by minor,
random initial differences in quality is thus to be expected.
These ever decreasing (or non-existing) cost of trans-
portation can be counter-balanced by introducing a tax
that scales with distance (e.g. a carbon tax). An imme-
diate side-effect of such market interference is less con-
sumption and hence decreased revenue for both firms.
(second vs. third bar on right axis in Figure 2). While
decentralised, locally self-contained economies may ben-
efit consumers on a grand scheme, it certainly punishes
remote buyers and is susceptible to potentially small
changes in location. Therefore, we propose to introduce
an ordinal tax instead. For each buyer, the distance to the
different firms is enumerated in increasing order. A buyer
has a distance of D = 0 from the physically (cardinally)
closest firm, a distance D = 1 from the second closest,
and so forth. The advantages of this tax are manifold.
First, it resolves the issue of remote buyers being worse
off. Second, it is not susceptible to (small) changes in
buyer or firm locations, and hence does not lead to phys-
ical centralisation (profits are exactly equal if c1 = c2).
Third, the overall level of revenue is elevated compared
to a cardinal tax, as now only remote purchases (D > 0)
are taxed (right axis in Figure 2). Fourth, marginal dif-
ferences in quality remain unnoticed, as the difference in
production cost does not outweigh taxation costs. Fifth,
major difference in quality (true competitive advantage),
overcomes the tax and rewards the more competitive firm
(cf. in Figure 2 the 50 times higher revenue in case of a
20% difference in production cost).
The ordinal tax is similar in spirit to, but more dynamic
than a country border tax. Most importantly, specialised
products are traded without tax (D = 0 everywhere) such
that innovation spreads globally. Products that are easy
to produce remain local. Competition is encouraged and
independent of a firms location, so there is no a priori pro-
tectionism. However, to actually outperform, significant
competitive advantages must be present. As such, the
ordinal tax acts as a type of centralisation threshold that
must be overcome. The value of that threshold is tuned by
the scaling factor λ. One can interpolate between the two
extremes of no transportation tax (λ = 0) and forced lo-
cal monopolisation (λ = ∞). A self-regulating adjustment
of λ based on different market conditions, targeted redis-
tribution of tax money and a practical implementation of
this tax on digital markets are part of ongoing research.
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